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Note
Sweetening the Deal: Strengthening
Transnational Bribery Laws Through Standard
International Corporate Auditing Guidelines
Timothy W. Schmidt∗
Throughout the past several decades, the German conglomerate Siemens AG regularly bribed government officials in
order to secure contracts and obtain favorable terms.1 Internal
investigations revealed that the company made more than $1.9
billion in bribes and other questionable payments to third parties.2 After an investigation lasting more than three years, a
German court fined the company $284 million, while fifteen
other countries also conducted investigations into the payments.3 Siemens is one of many large corporations that bribed
foreign government officials to gain a competitive advantage.4
But despite recent high-profile crackdowns, some developed na-
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1. Jack Ewing, Siemens Braces for a Slap from Uncle Sam, BUS. WK.,
Nov. 26, 2007, at 78, 78.
2. Id.
3. Peter H. Stone, White-Collar Crime—Crackdown on Foreign Bribery,
NAT’L J., Jan. 12, 2008, at 34, 38; see Michael D. Goldhaber, How the Massive
Siemens Bribery Scandal Made U.S.-Style Internal Investigations the New
Model for Europe, AM. LAW., May 2008, at 92, 92 (stating that investigations
of Siemens AG have occurred in “Austria, China, Greece, Hungary, Indonesia,
Israel, Italy, France, Germany, Japan, Liechtenstein, Nigeria, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, and the U.S.”).
4. Cf. Stone, supra note 3, at 35 (quoting a former chief of the U.S. Department of Justice’s fraud section as stating that other major companies are
being investigated for making large bribes).
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tions are slow in pursuing the domestic corporations they suspect of this behavior.5
A bribe is the payment by a briber of something of value to
the bribee in exchange for the bribee acting both in the briber’s
interest and contrary to the bribee’s own duties.6 With the rise
of government in the civilized world, the rich sought to use
their ample resources to influence those in power.7 Such transactions made sense on a basic level; on the surface, they merely
represented the giving of something of value in exchange for a
service rendered. But society soon began to reject bribery. An
Egyptian pharaoh announced a penalty of death for officials
who took bribes,8 and ancient Athens had a complex auditing
procedure to ensure that public officials did not use their position for personal gain.9
When a person bribes a state official, the state suffers in a
variety of ways. The poor of the society suffer since they cannot
compete with the rich in the market for government services,
be it road maintenance or criminal justice.10 The country as a
whole breaks down when it works only for pay, not out of the
interest of fairness.11 Government becomes inefficient and cannot provide social services at the same levels as less-corrupt
governments.12 Finally, bribery burdens businesses and the
economy of a nation in general and stands as a market entry
5. See Nelson D. Schwartz & Lowell Bergman, Payload: Taking Aim at
Corporate Bribery, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2007, at BU1 (noting that Britain and
Japan have declined to take part in global efforts to enforce existing antibribery laws).
6. See Stuart P. Green, What’s Wrong with Bribery, in DEFINING CRIMES:
ESSAYS ON THE SPECIAL PART OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 143, 145 (R.A. Duff &
Stuart P. Green eds., 2005).
7. Cf. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., BRIBES: THE INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF A
MORAL IDEA 10–11, 15 (1984) (describing examples of early legislation against
bribery in the writings of the Babylonians, Egyptians, and Israelites).
8. Id. at 11.
9. See ARISTOTLE, THE ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION pt. 48 (P.J. Rhodes
trans., Penguin Classics 1984).
10. See, e.g., Press Release, Transparency International, Poor Families
Hit Hardest by Bribery, Even in Rich Countries, Finds New TI Poll (Dec. 6,
2007),
http://www.transparency.org/news_room/latest_news/press_releases/
2007/2007_12_06_gcb_2007_en.
11. See, e.g., Sanjeev Gupta et al., Corruption and the Provision of Health
Care and Education Services, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORRUPTION
111, 132 (Arvind K. Jain ed., 2001) (“[A] high level of corruption has adverse
consequences for a country’s child and infant mortality rates, percent of lowbirthweight babies in total births, and dropout rates in primary schools.”).
12. See id.
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barrier for corporations.13 Bribery thus results in real costs to
societies and businesses, necessitating laws to reallocate the
cost of the bribes to the corrupt individuals who make them.14
This Note explores a number of options to promote the punishment of corrupt businesses that bribe foreign officials, even
when the prosecution of these businesses might not be in the
public interest of the company’s home country. Part I examines
several past efforts to root out transnational bribery in the
United States and Europe, most notably the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Part II critiques several new developments
in the war against transnational bribery, including the passage
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the ratification of an antibribery
treaty by members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. Part III proposes a more robust
treaty that not only outlaws transnational bribery, but also
gives developed nations the tools and the motivation to detect
it. Specifically, an international treaty against transnational
bribery should prohibit the bribing of foreign government officials, punish companies that keep inaccurate and incomplete
records, and provide incentives for private shareholders to support ratification and enforcement of treaty obligations. Such a
treaty would level the playing field for businesses by cutting
corruption and making corporations and governments more
transparent to taxpayers and shareholders.

13. See Vito Tanzi & Hamid Davoodi, Corruption, Growth, and Public
Finances, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORRUPTION, supra note 11, at 89,
106 (finding a positive correlation between corruption and “the allocation of
talent to unproductive activities” as well as a negative correlation between
corruption and growth). But see Michael Johnston, Measuring Corruption:
Numbers Versus Knowledge Versus Understanding, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORRUPTION, supra note 11, at 157, 157 (noting the difficulty in measuring the true cost of corruption).
14. But see Llewellyn H. Rockwell, The Right to Bribe, FREE MARKET
(Ludwig von Mises Inst., Auburn, Ala.) Aug. 1997, available at http://
mises.org/freemarket_detail.aspx?control=126 (arguing that bribes are a part
of doing business in foreign countries and the real cost to businesses are laws
against bribery); Pierre Lemieux, In Defense of Bribery, DAILY ARTICLE, Aug.
8, 2005, http://www.mises.org/story/1884 (stating that some countries could
not survive without bribes and a state which turns a blind eye to bribery is
still better than a complete autocracy).
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I. PAST ATTEMPTS TO OUTLAW
TRANSNATIONAL BRIBERY
A. UNITED STATES: THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
When Congress passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA) in 1977,15 it was the first attempt by a major Western
power to crack down on its own citizens and companies for bribery of foreign government officials.16 Congress passed the law
in the wake of public revelations that several large, multinational corporations were using their considerable wealth to
bribe foreign governments.17 The Watergate scandal showed
Congress that large American corporations used slush funds
not only to contribute illegally to political campaigns, but also
to bribe overseas foreign officials.18 These revelations contributed to the sense among the public and some lawmakers that
the nation needed new legislation to combat the problem of
transnational bribery.19
15. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat.
1494 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2006)), amended
by Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendment of 1988, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to
-3, 78ff (2006), and International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of
1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff (2006).
16. Arvind K. Jain, Power, Politics, and Corruption, in THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF CORRUPTION, supra note 11, at 3, 9 (referring to the FCPA as
“the oldest anti-bribery legislation in modern history”). But the FCPA was not
the first U.S. legislation intended to combat corporate bribery, only the first to
combat bribery of officials abroad. See GEORGE C. GREANIAS & DUANE WINDSOR, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 12 (1982) (discussing antibribery
provisions in several other laws, such as the Meat Inspection Act, Grain Standards Act, Internal Revue Code, Federal Trade Commission Act, and AntiKickback Act).
17. See Wesley Cragg & William Woof, Legislating Against Corruption in
International Markets: The Story of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, in
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORRUPTION, supra note 11, at 180, 181–82 (describing the public disclosure of the International Telephone and Telegraph
Corporation’s request to hire the CIA to prevent Salavadore Allende’s election
in Chile, and the revelations of kickbacks by Lockheed totaling more than
$200,000, and bribes by Gulf Oil to Korea).
18. See id. at 183.
19. A number of other theories have been put forward to explain why the
United States would unilaterally enact a law in which the penalties would
hurt American citizens and companies but whose benefits would mostly be felt
in other nations. Wesley Cragg and William Woof posit that the FCPA was a
way for the U.S. to regain some of the moral high ground which it lost after
Watergate and the Vietnam War. Id. at 187. John T. Noonan Jr. hypothesizes
that the wave of anticorruption which spawned the FCPA had its roots both in
a government trying to show that its citizens were less corrupt than the Soviet
Union’s, and in a society substituting government and corporate purity for the
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The FCPA consists of two parts: accounting provisions and
antibribery provisions. The provisions go hand-in-hand to ensure that a company accounts for these bribes—by their nature
secret transactions—in the company’s books.
The antibribery provisions make it a criminal offense to
corruptly use interstate commerce to offer or give anything of
value to an officer or employee of a foreign government, public
international organization, political party, or candidate for office, for the purpose of influencing any act or omission that violates a lawful duty, or securing an improper advantage, in order to assist in obtaining or retaining business with, or
directing business to, any person.20 The bribery provisions also
prohibit giving anything of value to an agent of one of the
above-listed people, or to any third party, with the knowledge
that all or some of the items of value will be offered or given to
a prohibited recipient.21 The provisions apply to any American
citizen, national, resident, or person within the United States;
or a business either organized in the United States or that issues securities under U.S. law; or any employee, officer or any
other agent of the above.22 It may be enforced against anyone
inside the United States or against any U.S. person or entity
outside the United States.23
The accounting provisions of the FCPA require that all
publicly traded companies keep accurate and detailed records
while also putting into place internal controls to ensure that all
company transactions are authorized and accounted for.24 The
degree of detail necessary in record keeping is defined using a
“reasonable detail” standard that would “satisfy prudent offi-

sexual purity lost in the 1960s and ’70s. NOONAN, supra note 7, at 598–600.
Others point to a desire to keep companies from interfering with U.S. foreign
interests. Mark Pieth, Introduction, in THE OECD CONVENTION ON BRIBERY 3,
8 (Mark Pieth et al. eds., 2007).
20. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3
(2006) (applying to issuers, domestic concerns, or any person, respectively); see
also Andrea Dahms & Nicolas Mitchell, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 44 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 605, 612–13 (2007) (describing the elements of a violation of the
FCPA antibribery provisions). Although not defined in the statute, legislative
history suggests that “‘corruptly’ connotes an evil motive or purpose, an intent
to wrongfully influence the recipient.” See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 10
(1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4108.
21. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), -3(a).
22. See id. §§ 78dd-1(a), -2(h).
23. See id. §§ 78dd-1(a), -2(a), -3(a).
24. Id. §§ 78m(a), (b)(2)–(7).
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cials in the conduct of their own affairs.”25 The internal controls
put in place must provide “reasonable assurances”26 that all
transactions have been properly authorized by management;27
all transactions have been recorded and accounted for according to the “generally accepted accounting principles”;28 that the
company’s assets can only be accessed with management’s approval;29 and that the company’s records are audited regularly,
with steps taken to correct any inaccuracies found.30
The FCPA provides for both criminal and civil penalties.
Fines can range as high as twenty-five million dollars for companies and five million dollars for individuals, while prison sentences for individuals may reach twenty years.31
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) handles
all civil investigations of publicly traded companies and may
forward a case warranting criminal prosecution to the Department of Justice (DOJ).32 The DOJ performs all criminal investigations of both public and private companies and civil investigations of private companies.33 The SEC also handles civil
injunctions against publicly traded companies and their officers
and employees, while the DOJ files suits for monetary damages.34
B. INTERNATIONAL TREATIES
Although many nations in Europe have long had robust
domestic antibribery laws, Europe was slow to follow the U.S.’s
lead in passing foreign antibribery laws.35 In fact, up until the
25. Id. § 78m(b)(7).
26. Id. § 78m(b)(2)(B). The FCPA later states that “reasonable assurances
. . . mean such level of detail and degree of assurance as would satisfy prudent
officials in the conduct of their own affairs.” Id. § 78m(b)(7).
27. Id. § 78m(b)(2)(B)(i).
28. Id. § 78m(b)(2)(B)(ii).
29. Id. § 78m(b)(2)(B)(iii).
30. Id. § 78m(b)(2)(B)(iv).
31. Id. §§ 78dd-2(d), (g), -3(d)–(e), 78ff. In reality, fines can go much higher since the Alternative Fine Act allows for a fine of up to twice the gain to the
corporation or individual. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (2000).
32. See S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 11–12 (1977), as reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4108.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. The United Kingdom, for example, has a history for prosecuting domestic bribery since at least 1769, LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 248, LEGISLATING THE CRIMINAL CODE: CORRUPTION ¶ 2.2 n.4 (1997), but did not outlaw foreign corruption until 2001, Ingeborg Zerbes, Article 1—The Offence of Bribery
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late 1990s, many European nations even allowed companies to
deduct bribes to foreign officials from their taxes.36 The reasons
for European reluctance to enact such laws are varied, but one
thing is clear: European companies benefited competitively
from the ability to operate in emerging markets with fewer restrictions than their American counterparts.37
The end of communism and the rise in economic globalization brought the nations of Europe together to start addressing
transnational bribery.38 Although each European nation implemented laws banning transnational bribery differently,39
several treaties established guidelines for their signatories to
follow.
In December 1997, members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) signed the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (the OECD Convention).40
Thirty-seven nations ratified the OECD Convention, including
all of Western Europe.41 The convention generally requires that
each signatory prohibit the bribing of foreign officials, set criminal and civil penalties for violations, and either extradite or
prosecute its nationals who are accused of bribery by another
of Foreign Public Officials, in THE OECD CONVENTION ON BRIBERY, supra
note 19, at 45, 87.
36. Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev., Testing the Convention, OECD OBSERVER, March 2007, at 7, 7, available at http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/
fullstory.php/aid/2161/Testing_the_convention.html (“Not long ago, writing off
bribes against tax was even allowed in several OECD countries; no longer.”).
37. See Pieth, supra note 19, at 5.
38. See id. at 5–6; see also Dahms & Mitchell, supra note 20, at 624; John
T. Noonan Jr., Struggling Against Corruption, in PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CORRUPTION 227, 229–30 (William C. Heffernan & John Kleinig eds., 2004).
39. See generally ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION (2007).
40. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, 112 Stat. 3302, 37 I.L.M. 1
(1998).
41. The European nations to ratify the OECD are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, and the United Kingdom. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY
OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS,
RATIFICATION STATUS AS OF 12 MARCH 2008, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
59/13/40272933.pdf. Several non-European nations have ratified the agreement as well, including Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Japan,
Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, and the United States. Id.
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signatory.42 It also contains provisions for continued monitoring
of the implementation of the convention by signatories.43 The
OECD publishes its findings on how well each signatory has
implemented the text and spirit of the convention through legislation and enforcement.44 Although the OECD convention
largely succeeded in ensuring implementation of laws in each
signatory nation, observers have criticized its lack of enforcement mechanism and its failure to ban all aspects of bribery.45
The Council of Europe (CoE) adopted conventions addressing criminal and civil penalties for corruption in January and
November 1999, respectively.46 The CoE Criminal Law Convention on Corruption directs its signatories to adopt laws that ban
the giving and receiving of bribes, both domestically and transnationally.47 In 2003, the Council of Europe expanded the criminal ban on transnational bribery to include bribes to arbitrators and jurors.48 Although the CoE adopted a mechanism for
monitoring each nation’s progress in implementation and enforcement, the results of the monitoring remain confidential,
unlike the OECD Convention.49 The Convention has been
signed by forty-four of the Council’s forty-seven member nations.50
42. See Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, supra note 40, art. 1.
43. Id. art. 12.
44. See, e.g., Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development,
Report on France, in IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION,
supra note 39, at 79.
45. See, e.g., Dahms & Mitchell, supra note 20, at 624 & n.127 (citing concerns that the OECD enforcement varies by nation, and noting that the convention does not eliminate the bribery of foreign political parties or candidates
for office, or the tax deductibility of bribes).
46. Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, Jan. 27, 1999, Europ. T.S.
No. 173, 38 I.L.M. 505 [hereinafter CoE Criminal Law Convention on Corruption]; Civil Law Convention on Corruption, Nov. 4, 1999, Europ. T.S. No. 174
[hereinafter CoE Civil Law Convention on Corruption].
47. See CoE Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, supra note 46, ch.
II, arts. 2–3, 17.
48. Additional Protocol to the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption,
May 15, 2003, Europ. T.S. No. 191, available at http://conventions.coe.int/
Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/191.htm.
49. See CoE Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, supra note 46, ch.
III, art. 24. A unit known as the Group of States Against Corruption, or GRECO, is responsible for the monitoring. Id.; see also STUART H. DEMING, THE
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL NORMS, 108
(2005) (comparing the confidential nature of GRECO’s reports with the public
nature of the OECD’s country reports).
50. See Council of Europe, Chart Showing Signatures and Ratifications of
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The companion convention the Council adopted, the CoE
Civil Law Convention on Corruption, mandates that each signatory create a private right of action for recovery of damages
due to corruption.51 The private right of action is unlike anything found in either the OECD Convention or the FCPA.52
Forty-one Council members signed, and thirty-two ratified, the
CoE Civil Law Convention on Corruption.53
In 2003, the United Nations also adopted a convention
against bribery.54 The U.N. Convention Against Corruption
calls on signatories to ban, among other things, bribery, money
laundering, trading in influence, and embezzlement.55 Like the
CoE Civil Convention on Corruption, the U.N. Convention
Against Corruption allows for a private right of recovery,56
while, like the FCPA, it also includes accounting provisions.57
The U.N. convention has been signed by 141 of the 153 U.N.
members and ratified or accepted by 111.58
Conventions and Agreements Concluded within the Council of Europe [hereinafter Chart Showing Signatures], http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/
ChercheSig.asp?NT=173&CM=1&CL=ENG.
51. CoE Civil Law Convention on Corruption, supra note 46, ch. I, art. 1.
52. Under the FCPA, a private citizen cannot generally bring a lawsuit
against a company that bribes foreign officials. See Lamb v. Phillip Morris,
Inc., 915 F.2d 1024, 1027–30 (6th Cir. 1990); J.S. Serv. Ctr. Corp. v. Gen. Elec.
Technical Servs. Co., 937 F.Supp. 216, 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“The
FCPA . . . provides no explicit private right of action.”). Compare CoE Civil
Law Convention on Corruption, supra note 46 (providing a private right of action), with Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-213, 91 Stat.
1494 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2006)), amended
by Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendment of 1988, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to 3, 78ff (2006), and International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of
1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff (2006) (criminalizing bribery and providing a civil action to be brought only by the Attorney General), and Convention
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, supra note 40, 112 Stat. at 3302–03, 37 I.L.M. at 4, (criminalizing bribery).
53. See Chart Showing Signatures, supra note 50.
54. United Nations Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/58/422 (Dec. 11, 2003).
55. Id. arts. 15–24.
56. Id. art. 35.
57. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78q(b) (2006); id.
art. 12.
58. See Signatories to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption,
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html (last visited Jan.
19, 2009). Several other international conventions also address transnational
bribery. The European Union passed a convention in 1997 outlawing bribery
of EU officials or members of EU governments, but it did not apply to officials
outside of Europe. See Convention on the Fight Against Corruption Involving
Officials of the European Communities or Officials of Member States of the
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C. EUROPEAN LEGISLATION
European nations, which before their ratification of international conventions had few if any laws outlawing transnational bribery, have since implemented the requirements of the
OECD and CoE treaties in a variety of ways.59 By way of example, this section will examine two approaches to legislating
against transnational bribery.
The United Kingdom, which had existing common law60
and statutory bribery offenses,61 simply modified these existing
European Union, May 26, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 195) 1 [hereinafter EU Corruption Convention]. Also in 1997, the Organization of American States ratified a
convention that binds most nations of the Western Hemisphere to pass and
enforce strict laws against transnational bribery. See Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention Against Corruption arts. II–III, Mar.
29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 724, 728–29 [hereinafter OAS Corruption Convention]. The
Pacific Basin Economic Council adopted a statement the same year that “encourages” its twenty members to adopt laws banning transnational bribery
and forcing businesses to abide by FCPA-like accounting standards. Pacific
Basin Economic Council [PBEC], Statement on Standards for Transactions
Between Business and Governments (Nov. 21, 1997), http://www.pbec.org/
index2.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=61&itemid=24.htm.
The African Union adopted a convention in 2003 that prohibited public and
private corruption while endorsing whistleblower provisions, but it has only
been adopted by twenty-seven of the fifty-three nations of Africa. See African
Union, Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, arts. 5, 12, July
11, 2003, 43 I.L.M. 5 [hereinafter AU Corruption Convention]; African Union,
List of Countries Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the African Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, http://www.africa-union.org/
root/au/Documents/Treaties/List/African Convention on Combating Corruption.pdf (last visited Dec. 4, 2008).
59. For a complete report on the laws regarding transnational bribery in
Europe, see THE OECD CONVENTION ON BRIBERY, supra note 19, at 289, 553–
62 (stating that enforcement of the OECD Convention is “subject to the applicable rules and principles of each party,” and listing the applicable sanctions
for each party to the Convention); ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY
CONVENTION (2004 & 2005) (providing a report for each signatory that describes the legal provisions in place to combat bribery and a review of their
effectiveness); Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: National Implementing Legislation [hereinafter OECD Anti-Bribery Convention], http://www.oecd.org/document/30/
0,3343,en_2649_34859_2027102_1_1_1_1,00.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2009)
(listing members’ national implementing legislation by country).
60. See LAW COMM’N, supra note 35, at ¶¶ 2.2–.5 (1997)
(citing a treatise and several cases, most notably R. v. Whitaker, [1914] 3 K.B.
1283, in which a colonel accepted a bribe from a catering company in return
for allowing the caterers to serve the colonel’s regiment).
61. Prevention of Corruption Act 1916, 6 & 7 Geo. 5, c. 64 (Eng.); Prevention of Corruption Act 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 34 (Eng.); Public Bodies Corrupt
Practices Act, 1889, 52 & 53 Vict., c. 69 (Eng.); see also LAW COMM’N, supra
note 35, at ¶¶ 2.6–.16 (citing the Prevention of Corruption Acts 1889 to 1916);
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laws by applying them to foreign agents and governments62
while also extending U.K. jurisdiction to apply to any British
national operating outside of the country.63 British law currently provides for a criminal penalty of seven years imprisonment
with no limit on fines for persons or corporations.64
France complied with its convention obligations by passing
an act that amended its Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure
to outlaw transnational bribery,65 in addition to the existing
provisions that prohibited domestic bribery.66 French law currently provides for a maximum incarceration penalty of ten
years and a €150,000 fine for persons who violate the law and a
fine of €750,000 for companies that violate the law, among other provisions.67
II. CRITIQUE OF CURRENT EFFORTS TO CURB
TRANSNATIONAL BRIBERY
Although the United States and most European nations
passed strict laws to prohibit transnational bribery,68 less accord exists in the enforcement of these laws. The United States
WORKING GROUP ON BRIBERY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS, ORGANISATION
FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, UNITED KINGDOM: REVIEW
OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION AND 1997 RECOMMENDATION,
PHASE I BIS REPORT 2–3 (2002), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
12/50/2498215.pdf (describing antibribery laws of the United Kingdom prior to
the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Securities Act of 2009).
62. See Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, 49 Eliz. 2, c. 24,
§ 108(1) (Eng.). The laws were changed by simply redefining their terms to include bribery of foreign government officials within the scope of the old laws.
See id. § 108(2)–(4).
63. See id. § 109.
64. See THE OECD CONVENTION ON BRIBERY, supra note 19, at 559.
65. Law No. 2000-595 of June 30, 2000, Journal Officiel de la République
Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], July 1, 2000, p. 9944, translated
in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Report on
France, in IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION 82–85
(2005).
66. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Report
on France, in IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION 7 (2005)
(referring to existing domestic bribery laws in Articles 433-1 and 432-11 of
France’s Criminal Code that “prosecuted only active and passive bribery involving French persons entrusted with public authority, charged with a public
service mission, or holding an elected office”).
67. See THE OECD CONVENTION ON BRIBERY, supra note 19, at 554–55.
68. See generally Ingeborg Zerbes, Article 1—The Offence of Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials, in THE OECD CONVENTION ON BRIBERY, supra note
19, at 45, 84–119 (critiquing the implementation of transnational antibribery
laws by signatories to the OECD Convention).
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enforced its antibribery legislation with renewed vigor,69 while
European nations have been slow to prosecute offending corporations.70
A. THE UNITED STATES: NEW DRIVE AND NEW LAW
1. Increasingly Vigorous Enforcement
The United States has seen a large growth in enforcement
under the FCPA by both the SEC and the DOJ.71 In recent
years, the SEC hired hundreds of employees to enforce all corporate compliance cases, the DOJ hired two attorneys to focus
only on FCPA cases, and the FBI created a new four-person
unit that handles only FCPA investigations.72 Government officials publicly announced that they will be monitoring companies for FCPA violations more carefully than they have before.73
As a result of these changes, although only fifty persons
and companies were named as defendants in the first twenty
years after the FCPA was enacted, there were eighty-two defendants between 1997 and July 2007.74 At the end of 2007, the
U.S. government had open investigations into eighty-four companies for FCPA violations.75
69. See, e.g., Emma Schwartz, Hiking the Cost of Bribery, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Aug. 13, 2007, at 31 (“[I]n recent years, federal prosecutors have
begun cracking down on companies and their executives for bribing officials
overseas. . . . Using a 1977 law, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the feds
have prosecuted four times the number of foreign bribery cases in the past
fives years as in the preceding five.”).
70. See, e.g., Matthew Saltmarsh, OECD Fears Weakening of U.K. Bribery
Stance, INT’L HERALD TRIB. (Paris), Mar. 15, 2007, at 10 (“An OECD working
group said that previous recommendations to correct shortcomings in British
law remained unimplemented, and Britain had failed to bring a single prosecution in foreign bribery cases since introducing a new law in 2001.”).
71. See, e.g., Russell Gold & David Crawford, U.S., Other Nations Step Up
Bribery Battle, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2008, at B1 (describing the DOJ prosecution of former Halliburton Co. executive Albert J. “Jack” Stanley and the SEC
settlement with Baker Hughes Inc.); Schwartz, supra note 69.
72. Sue Reisinger, On Bended Knee: Companies Are Disclosing Overseas
Bribes in Record Numbers. But Is Confession Always Necessary?, AM. LAW.,
July 2007, at 73, 74.
73. See, e.g., Eric Torbenson, Tougher Laws Have Reduced Financial
Fraud, SEC Official Says, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 14, 2007, at A5
(quoting Deputy Assistant Attorney General Barry Sabin).
74. See William F. Pendergast & Jennifer D. Riddle, Comments Addressing Recent and Future FCPA Enforcement Issues, in THE FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT 153, 157 (2007).
75. See Gold & Crawford, supra note 71 (“The U.S. federal government
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Penalties in the United States have also been increasing.
The SEC and the DOJ fined Baker Hughes, Inc. forty-four million dollars for the bribery of Kazakhstani officials through
third-party agents in Kazakhstan and Angola in order to obtain
an oil services contract.76 Titan Corporation reached a settlement with the U.S. government in which it paid more than
twenty-eight million dollars in civil and criminal penalties for
payments it made to the re-election campaign of the president
of Benin in exchange for receiving higher fees for its telecommunications contract with the country.77 As recently as August
2007, Textron Inc. agreed to disgorge $2.7 million in profits,
and additionally pay nearly $2 million in fines and penalties for
bribes, including kickbacks made to the government of Iraq relating to the U.N. Oil for Food Program.78 Wary of stricter enforcement, companies increasingly self-report violations79 and
enter into deferred or nonprosecution agreements with U.S. Attorneys to avoid costly litigation and bad press.80

had open investigations into 84 companies at the end of last year.”).
76. See Lucinda A. Low, et al., Enforcement of the FCPA in the United
States: Trends and the Effects of International Standards, in THE FOREIGN
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT, supra note 72, 101, 123–24; Reisinger, supra note
72.
77. See Low et al., supra note 76, at 126–27; Reisinger, supra note 72.
78. Litigation Release, U.S. Sec. and Exchange Comm’n., SEC Files Settled Books and Records and Internal Controls Charges Against Textron Inc.
for Improper Payments to Iraq Under the U.N. Oil for Food Program (Aug. 23,
2007),
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr20251.htm.
These
amounts include disgorgement of $2,284,579 in profits, $450,461.68 in interest, a civil penalty of $800,000 pursuant to the SEC prosecution, and a
$1,150,000 fine pursuant to a DOJ nonprosecution agreement. Id.
79. Gold & Crawford, supra note 71 (noting that companies are increasingly self-reporting their FCPA violations in hopes of receiving more lenient
penalties).
80. Since August 2007, the following companies have entered into deferred or nonprosecution agreements with U.S. Attorney offices over allegations of FCPA violations: Faro Technologies, Inc. (June 2008, $2.95 million);
AGA Medical Corp. (June 2008, $2 million); Willbros Group, Inc. (May 2008,
$32.3 million); AB Volvo (Mar. 2008, $19.6 million), Flowserve Corp. (Feb.
2008, $10.5 million), Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies Corp. (Feb. 2008,
$677,000), Lucent Technologies (Dec. 2007, $2.5 million), Akzo Nobel N.V.
(Dec. 2007, $3.75 million), Chevron Corp. (Nov. 2007, $27 million), IngersollRand (Oct. 2007, $7 million); York International Corp. (Oct. 2007, $22 million),
Paradigm B.V. (Sept. 2007, $1 million), Textron (Aug. 2007, $4.65 million)
(agreements on file with author).
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2. Passage of Sarbanes-Oxley
Observers offer a variety of reasons for the increase in
prosecutions, plea agreements, and voluntary disclosures,81 but
a general consensus exists that the 2002 passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act82 spurred increased prosecutions due to the increase of information to which the government had access.83
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 in
response to the public unraveling of several companies due to
fraudulent transactions and the misreporting of corporate earnings.84 The law includes many provisions designed to bolster
the public’s trust in corporate America,85 but most notably re81. See, e.g., Low, et al., supra note 76, at 8 (citing changes to the federal
sentencing guidelines); Schwartz, supra note 69 (citing an increase in international cooperation and an uptick in the amount of corporate mergers and acquisitions); Claudius O. Sokenu, Record-Setting Penalties Show New Push
Under FCPA, N.Y. L. J., Aug. 6, 2007, (citing cooperation between the SEC
and the DOJ as a reason for an increase in prosecution); cf. David Hess, A
Business Ethics Perspective on Sarbanes-Oxley and the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1781, 1783 (2007) (noting that the Federal Guidelines were amended in 2004 due to a requirement in the SarbanesOxley Act that they be reviewed).
82. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.); see also Press Release, White
House, President Bush Signs Corporate Corruption Bill (July 30, 2002),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/20020730.html.
83. See Low, et al., supra note 76 (describing how the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley has intensified ethics and compliance programs of U.S. listed
companies); Reisinger, supra note 72 (“The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 mandated extra record keeping duties, compliance programs, and ‘whistle blower’
hotlines that have turned up numerous bribe allegations.”); Schwartz, supra
note 69 (describing how Sarbanes-Oxley has “increased reporting requirements for public companies” leading “many firms to beef up internal investigation units” and provided incentives to disclose wrongdoing).
84. See Suzanne Malreaux, Bush Signs Bill to Stop ‘Book Cooking,’ CNN,
July
31,
2002,
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/07/30/bush
.corporate.reform/index.html; cf. Hess, supra note 81, at 1782 (describing the
persistent corruption concerns and the role of SOX in “restoring public trust in
the marketplace”).
85. See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. E1451 (daily ed. July 22, 2002) (statement of
Rep. Sununu) (“[Sarbanes-Oxley will include] a requirement for real-time corporate disclosure, [in order to] better protect investors. . . . [It will] strengthen[ ] the penalties for corporate fraud, [which] will act as a better deterrent
to those seeking to stretch or, [sic] test the boundaries of the law. . . . [And it
will include an] investor restitution provision [which] will enable investors
who lose money in the markets as a result of corporate malfeasance to reclaim
the gains of corporate criminals.”). Sarbanes-Oxley also includes a prohibition
on nonaudit work by auditing firms, Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 201–209, a requirement that companies establish independent audit committees, § 301, the
creation of an oversight board, §§ 101–109, and a prohibition on loans to corporate executives, § 402.
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quires certification of company financial statements by top executives,86 protects whistleblowers who report suspected corporate fraud from retaliation,87 and holds corporate management
and auditors responsible for maintaining and assessing an internal corporate system for financial reporting to the SEC.88
The Act caused a good deal of consternation among corporations, which balked at the estimated cost of the new requirements.89
Additional certification and reporting requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley bolstered the existing accounting provisions of the
FCPA and gave the SEC new information about the goings-on
inside America’s publicly traded companies.90 It also upped the
ante for companies, exposing corporate directors to increased
liability if they chose not to comply with the law.91 Under the
pressure, many corporations chose to report dubious transactions that may or may not have constituted FCPA violations rather than take the risk that the SEC would find out on its own
later.92
B. EUROPE: MIXED SIGNALS ON BRIBERY
Though the U.S. government turned up the heat on transnational bribery violations, enforcement in Europe was more
lukewarm. The United Kingdom especially has been called to
task for failing to enforce its laws against transnational bribery.93 In early 2007, the U.K. halted an investigation into
weapons manufacturer BAE Systems, with Prime Minister Tony Blair intimating that the prospect of losing “thousands of
British jobs and billions worth of pounds for British industry”
86. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 1350(a).
87. Id. § 1514A(a).
88. Id. §§ 7241(a), 7262.
89. See, e.g., Auditing Sarbanes-Oxley: A Price Worth Paying?, ECONOMIST, May 21, 2005, at 71 (“America’s businessmen are deeply unhappy, and
with reason: the initial costs of the [Sarbanes-Oxley Act] have been bigger
than expected.”). A study by Ivy Xiying Zhang of the William E. Simon Graduate School of Business Administration at the University of Rochester predicts
that the law will cost businesses $1.4 trillion. Id.
90. See Schwartz, supra note 69.
91. Id. (“The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 . . . increased reporting requirements for public companies and put the liability for their veracity directly on
top executives.”).
92. See Reisinger, supra note 72 (stating that, according to a case digest
published by Shearman & Sterling LLP, from 2005 to 2007, twenty-one of the
twenty-five new FCPA cases were self-reported).
93. Saltmarsh, supra note 70.
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was not worth pursuing prosecution.94 In addition, the U.K.
government failed to prosecute any transnational bribery cases
as of early 2007, despite numerous investigations.95 A report by
Transparency International in September 2008 suggests that
little progress has been made since then.96 An organization official lamented: “The Government has known for a decade that it
had to act; but it has dithered indecisively while the country’s
reputation has been ruined.”97
France, Italy, and the Netherlands have increased the
amount of transnational bribery cases prosecuted.98 But anecdotal evidence seems to indicate that these nations are not aggressive enough.99 In one case, for example, Costa Rica brought
charges against the French telecommunications company Alcatel in 2004, though prosecution by France itself was not forthcoming.100
Germany is an exception in Europe, with investigations of
Bristol-Myers, GlaxoSmithKline, DaimlerChrysler, Philips, and
Siemens AG currently underway.101 As of October 2007,
charges have been filed against Siemens executives involving
the bribery of Italian officials.102
The wide discrepancy in prosecution of laws against transnational bribery requires a reevaluation of how regulators
around the world pursue and put an end to this widespread international corruption.

94. Christopher Adams et al., Blair Defends Move to Halt BAE Inquiry,
FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 15, 2006.
95. See Saltmarsh, supra note 70.
96. Cash for Honours Blackens UK’s Reputation, BIRMINGHAM POST, Sept.
24, 2008, at 9.
97. Id. (quoting Chandrashekhar Krishnan, executive director of Transparency International UK).
98. Doreen Carvajal, A Global Effort to Root Out Corporate Bribery is
Flagging, INT’L HERALD TRIB. (Paris), July 18, 2007, at 9.
99. For example, these nations often will not prosecute instances of bribery of foreign officials by their domestic corporations, even when other nations found sufficient evidence to bring charges.
100. Carol Matlack et al., Cracking Down on Corporate Bribery, BUS. WK.,
Dec. 6, 2004, at 30.
101. Margaret Ayres et al., Developments in U.S. and International Efforts
to Prevent Corruption, 41 INT’L LAW. 597, 606 (2007).
102. Saltmarsh, supra note 70.
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III. RETHINKING THE UNILATERAL APPROACH TO
CORPORATE AUDITING REQUIREMENTS
In order to get a tighter grip on foreign bribery, member
states of the OECD should pass a new convention, called the
Corporate Auditing and Certification Convention, which would
require management of all companies publicly traded on stock
exchanges within member states to certify that company books
are accurate, certify that management has control over corporate assets, and have an independent auditor certify that such
control existed. In addition, the OECD convention would
mandate that national auditor boards would confer on a regular basis to ensure that auditing standards would be similar
from nation to nation. The benefits that ratification would
bring to shareholders in companies traded in signatory nations
would make it more feasible to garner enough support to ratify
the convention.
A. A NEW OECD CONVENTION ON CORPORATE AUDITING AND
CERTIFICATION
First, member states would need to pass laws requiring
corporate executives of publicly traded companies to certify
that their companies’ financial statements are accurate103 and
provide criminal sanctions for knowingly filing an incorrect financial statement.104 These provisions would create greater accountability with corporate management for financial irregularities and prevent companies from claiming that they did not
realize that employees created slush funds or bribed foreign officials.
Second, member states would need to pass laws requiring
corporate executives of publicly traded companies to certify
that management had control over all of the company’s assets
and have an external auditor attest to that fact.105 This provision would enact the recommendations that the Council of the
OECD made in May 1997 but that were not incorporated into
103. Cf. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §§ 302(a)(1)–(3), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 7241(a)(1)–(3) (2006) (requiring a signing officer to attest that the financial
report fairly presents the financial condition of the corporation).
104. Cf. id. § 906(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1350(a) (2006) (requiring each periodic financial report to contain a written statement of the CEO and CFO (or equivalent thereof ) that the report fairly represents the financial condition of the
corporation).
105. Cf. id. § 404, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2006) (requiring management to establish adequate internal control structures for financial reporting).
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the Convention on Bribery.106 In addition, this provision would
secure the obligation for internal controls with the requirement
that both corporate management and external auditors affirm
that adequate internal controls existed.
Finally, member states would agree to create national accounting boards that would confer on a regular basis to create
substantially similar auditing guidelines for all OECD member
nations.107 These accounting boards would create the specific
guidelines that corporate auditors would have to abide by when
auditing the internal controls of publicly traded companies.
B. NECESSARY STEPS TOWARDS IMPLEMENTATION
The Corporate Auditing and Certification Convention,
much like the OECD Convention on Bribery, would be drafted
by the Council of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development and come into force only after a majority of
the largest exporting nations had signed the document.108 By
way of example, a few nations will be considered to demonstrate the necessary changes that they would need to enact
when becoming a part of the new convention.
After the United States becomes a signatory to the Corporate Auditing and Certification Convention, Congress would
not need to make many changes to existing United States law.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act already requires corporate management to certify the accuracy of books and adequacy of control
over assets, as well as to have auditor certification.109 Regulations concerning the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board, also created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, could be mod106. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
REVISED RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL ON COMBATING BRIBERY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS (1997), available at http://www.oecd
.org/document/32/0,3343,en_2649_34859_2048160_1_1_1_1,00.html.
107. Cf. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §§ 101, 103, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211, 7213
(2006) (establishing the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board to oversee and audit public companies).
108. Cf. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, supra note 40.
109. Section 302 of the Act requires that management of public companies
certify that their financial statements are accurate “in all material respects.”
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(3). Section 906
contains provisions for criminal sanctions against CEOs and CFOs who willfully and knowingly make material misstatements in financial reports. Id.
§ 906(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1350(a). Section 404 contains provisions for management
certification that the internal controls of the company are adequate, backed up
by an external auditor. Id. § 404, 15 U.S.C. § 7262.
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ified to allow for its consultation with other national accounting
boards set up pursuant to the new convention.110
Similarly, Japan has already enacted a law that mirrors
Sarbanes-Oxley in the United States in several regards.111 Minor adjustments to this legislation could bring that nation into
compliance with the new convention.
European nations would have to pass new laws to implement the convention, although some European states have begun implementing rules requiring certification of internal controls.112 France, for instance, has rules requiring management
to assess its internal controls,113 and the European Union requires that publicly traded companies have an audit committee.114
Though European Union member nations would sign the
convention individually,115 existing European Union law requires that any changes member nations make to their laws
concerning regulation of companies and securities be in harmony.116

110. Id. §§ 101–109, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211–7219.
111. See Kinyū Shōhin Torihiki Hou [Financial Instruments and Exchange
Law (FIEL)], Law No. 65 of 2006; see also FINANCIAL SERVICES AGENCY, JAPAN, NEW LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR INVESTOR PROTECTION: “THE FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS AND EXCHANGE LAW” (2006), available at http://www
.fsa.go.jp/en/policy/fiel/20061010.pdf. Similar to Sarbanes-Oxley, Japan’s law
requires that companies demonstrate internal control over their finances. Jeremy Grant, Sarbox Changes Welcomed but Imitators Still Abound, FIN.
TIMES (London), Mar. 22, 2007, at 23.
112. See Robert A. Prentice & David B. Spence, Sarbanes-Oxley as Quack
Corporate Governance: How Wise is the Received Wisdom?, 95 GEO. L.J. 1843,
1903 n.329 (listing several European nations with laws or proposed laws regarding assessment of internal controls).
113. Grant, supra note 111.
114. Id.
115. Although the European Union could itself be a signatory to the new
convention, it still cannot bind its member states to treaties that it signs unless its member states have given it permission to do so, even after the new
Reform Treaty was signed in Portugal in December 2007. Stephen Mulvey, A
Close Look at the Reform Treaty, BBC NEWS, Aug. 3, 2007, http://news.bbc.co
.uk/2/hi/europe/6928737.stm (last visited Jan. 19, 2009).
116. See NIAMH MOLONEY, EC SECURITIES REGULATION 843–47 (2002), for
a discussion of securities-regulating institutions in the European Union.

2009]

TRANSNATIONAL BRIBERY LAWS

1139

C. THE BENEFITS OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON
CORPORATE AUDITING AND CERTIFICATION
1. Decrease in the Bribery of Foreign Government Officials
Passage of a new OECD convention with powerful accounting provisions would better ensure that foreign bribery could
not continue unnoticed. Slush funds and under-the-table transactions would be harder to hide with independent auditors
combing over corporate files and corporate management running the risk of personal liability if their company’s filings were
incorrect.117 Even if some governments failed to prosecute under their own accounting or bribery laws, the increased public
information generated by the accounting requirements would
make it easier for other nations to prosecute or for shareholders
to sue for recovery.
2. Additional Benefits to Europe
Even if the proposed Corporate Auditing and Certification
Convention results in a decrease in the bribery of foreign officials, European governments would still require a reason to
motivate them into signing it.118 The added costs to European
companies of complying with certification and auditing requirements would prevent some nations from signing on, in the
absence of any other compelling reason to agree to such an arrangement.
First, many European companies are already subject to
these sorts of requirements, due to their listing on stock exchanges in the United States.119 For example, companies such
as Toyota Motor, Sony, HBSC, and BP are based in foreign
countries, yet still need to abide by Sarbanes-Oxley since they
are listed on the New York Stock Exchange.120 These large
117. After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act passed, a similar effect took place in the
United States. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 69 (quoting Matt Morley, a
Washington, D.C. lawyer who defends companies in bribery cases, stating that
“[c]ompanies are less willing to take the risk that a violation they learned of
won’t be discovered”).
118. The sweeping changes to United States law was due to the Enron crisis. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Sarbanes-Oxley: Legislating in Haste,
Repenting in Leisure 2 (UCLA Sch. of Law, Law & Economics Research Paper
Series, Research Paper No. 06-14, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=899593.
119. Hannah Clark, Sarbanes-Oxley Goes Global, FORBES, July 13, 2006,
available at http://www.forbes.com/2006/07/13/leadership-sarbox-governancecx_hc_0713sarboxgoesglobal_print.html.
120. Id.
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multinational corporations faced the decision of whether to delist in the United States and instead go to a competing exchange
where Sarbanes-Oxley would not be enforced, or stay in the
U.S. and invest in the necessary changes to corporate auditing
practices that the law required. After investing so much money
into making their own corporate practices more transparent,
the companies have an incentive to force their counterparts
listed on the London or Paris stock exchanges to abide by similar guidelines rather than get away with less rigorous auditing
standards.
Second, European shareholders would benefit from the additional details about companies that they would gain from the
requirement of certification and auditing.121 Although European nations already have reporting requirements, they are not
as stringent as requirements in the United States and Japan.122 This lack of adequate information makes it more difficult for investors to fully understand the relative risk and value
of owning a particular security. In addition, some studies show
that companies with greater internal controls also perform better.123
A major hurdle to any convention would be the perception
that America was attempting to force its laws upon other nations. Even some American commentators suggest that European nations should stand up to American attempts to outlaw
international bribery.124 But many Western nations already
took steps against international bribery of their own accord.
Adoption of a Corporate Auditing and Certification Convention
would add a uniformity to laws and transparency to enforcement that currently does not exist.
So long as the perceived benefits to the shareholders are
greater than the decrease in share value due to the increased
121. Prentice & Spence, supra note 112, at 1906 (“[C]ertification of financial statements and internal financial controls . . . provide useful information
to the capital markets that will allow them to allocate capital more efficiently.”).
122. See OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 59.
123. Prentice & Spence, supra note 112, at 1905 (citing a study which
found that surveyed companies with effective internal controls had an average
share price increase of over twenty-five percent, while those that had ineffective internal controls decreased more than five percent).
124. See Rockwell, supra note 14 (“[C]ountries should stand up to the U.S.
government by taking the only correct free-market position: there should be no
laws against bribing foreign officials. In many countries, bribes are the only
means for outwitting leviathan, and thus serve as an institutional bulwark of
prosperity.”).
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cost of regulation, European shareholders will also favor laws
forcing companies to certify and audit their books, making implementation of the convention more feasible.
3. Additional Benefits to the United States
A corporate auditing and certification convention that incorporates many of the existing requirements of the accounting
provisions of the FCPA and the certification and auditing requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley would benefit the United States
in several ways.
First, such a treaty would level the playing field for United
States companies.125 As was the case after the passage of the
FCPA in the 1970s,126 American companies acted as guinea
pigs for a new corporate governance law.127 Enactment of an
OECD convention would decrease the incentive for companies
to delist or list on foreign stock exchanges to save them from
the extra burden of complying with Sarbanes-Oxley.128
Second, such an OECD convention would increase the likelihood that United States regulators could bring non-U.S.based companies to justice when they commit acts of foreign
bribery. The increased information which audited and certified
company records create would give prosecutors more information to work from when pursuing charges against American
employees or subsidiaries of foreign companies.129
Third, just as a Corporate Auditing and Certification Convention would benefit American companies by leveling the
playing field for companies, such a convention would benefit
125. See, e.g., MOLONEY, supra note 116, at 7 (noting, in the context of European securities regulation, that “[r]egulatory divergences and the duplication of rules can amount to non-tariff barriers . . . and prevent the development of the level playing-field . . . .”).
126. See Jain, supra note 16, at 9.
127. While SOX affects every company listed on the U.S. stock exchange,
American companies make up the vast majority of the companies traded on
the NYSE and NASDAQ (86.1% on the NYSE, and 90% on the NASDAQ in
June 2006 as reported in http://www.world-exchanges.org/WFE/home.asp
?menu=395).
128. See Clark, supra note 119 (stating that seventeen percent of European
firms would consider delisting from United States stock exchanges to keep
from having to comply with Sarbanes-Oxley).
129. See Joseph P. Covington et al., FCPA Enforcement in a SarbanesOxley World, LAW J. NEWSLS.: CORP. COUN., Aug. 2005, http://www.jenner
.com/news/pubs_item.asp?id=000013116724 (noting that increased selfdisclosure of violations due to Sarbanes-Oxley has led to more prosecutions for
FCPA violations).
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potential American shareholders of European securities. Certification would increase the information available to potential
shareholders of European securities, leading to more efficient
distribution of capital.130 Informed shareholders can make more
informed decisions about whether a company is healthy or
weak, increasing certainty and decreasing perceived risk.
Sarbanes-Oxley undoubtedly added cost to businesses. But
despite widespread corporate opposition, the Act is likely here
to stay as U.S. court challenges continue to founder. The D.C.
Circuit in August 2008 ruled that Sarbanes-Oxley did not violate either the Appointments Clause or the principle of separation of powers.131 While the losing plaintiffs in the D.C. Circuit looked to Congress and the SEC for relief,132 action by
either of those bodies looks increasingly unlikely as the housing
crisis has turned the public against corporations133 and has led
to calls for increased corporate regulation by both the SEC134
and the White House.135
With Sarbanes-Oxley as a reality for corporations in the
United States, American corporations’ best hope of competitiveness is for the costs to be shared by businesses in other nations. For American corporations, compliance should cost less
with uniform laws on corporate auditing and certification than
with a variety of standards.136
130. Prentice & Spence, supra note 112, at 1906 (“[C]ertification of financial statements and internal financial controls . . . provide useful information
to the capital markets that will allow them to allocate capital more efficiently.”).
131. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d
667, 669 (D.C. Cir. 2008). It is unclear whether the plaintiffs will file a petition
for certiorari to the Supreme Court. See Statement of Brad Beckstead, Managing Partner, Beckstead and Watts, LLP (Aug. 22, 2008), http://www
.becksteadwatts.com/index.html (“I am currently discussing all legal options
with our firm’s attorneys.”).
132. See Statement of Brad Beckstead, supra note 131 (“I encourage Congress and the SEC to take action now to remove the “barriers to entry” to US
capital markets for small and developing companies by exempting micro- and
small-cap public companies and smaller audit firms from the regulatory oversight of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.”).
133. See Kara Scannell et al., Bailout Stirs Calls for Deeper Regulation,
WALL ST. J. Sept. 24, 2008, at A1.
134. Id. (quoting SEC Chairman Christopher Cox as stating the crisis highlighted a “regulatory hole that must be immediately addressed”).
135. Id. (noting Treasury Secretary Henry Paulsen’s advocacy for an increased government role in financial markets).
136. Cf. Mark B. Baker, Promises and Platitudes: Toward a New 21st Century Paradigm for Corporate Codes of Conduct?, 23 CONN. J. INT’L L. 123, 161
(2007) (stating that, in the context of state law, uniform laws on corporate
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4. Additional Benefits to All Developed Nations
Though an OECD Corporate Certification and Auditing
Convention would have unique benefits for the United States
and Europe, it would also have positive effects on humanitarian
efforts, diplomacy, and economies to all signatories.
First, such a convention would help ensure that foreign aid
is better spent in developing economies. Currently, much foreign aid ends up lining the pockets of corrupt foreign officials
rather than helping its intended recipients.137 A corrupt atmosphere will drive away foreign investment, along with a community’s chance to prosper from it.138 Developing economies often
lack the resources that developed nations possess when it
comes to combating such abuses.139 An international convention requiring certification of financial reports and auditing of
internal controls would make foreign aid more effective.
A convention that banded nations together towards forcing
multinational conglomerates to better report and authenticate
their books and records would also improve the national security of member nations. One of the original reasons behind the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was to ensure that corporations
did not stray far into the area of international foreign policy
through bribery,140 and the same rationale holds true today.141
Several powerful governments policing companies, all armed
with common information about discrepancies in the company’s
financial records, would decrease the likelihood that one company will remain above the law.
compliance would “remove redundancies and economic inefficiency”).
137. For example, the SEC alleges that Textron, an industrial equipment
company, paid $650,539 in “kickback payments” as part of its sale of humanitarian supplies in the Iraq Oil for Food Program. U.S. Sec. and Exchange
Comm’n, supra note 78.
138. See Allan Gerson et al., Peace Building: The Private Sector’s Role, 95
AM. J. INT’L L. 102, 118 (2001) (stating that while a corrupt marketplace may
benefit individual companies, a culture of corruption will drive off foreign investment).
139. See David Pilling, Zoellick Charts Bank’s New Direction, FIN. TIMES
(London), Aug. 10, 2007, at 2 (citing Cambodia’s loss of its intellectuals to genocide as an example of how some countries lack the basic human capital to
fight corruption).
140. Pieth, supra note 19, at 8 (citing fears that defense industries could
open up illicit markets in the Middle East through bribery).
141. See, e.g., Saltmarsh, supra note 70 (citing a statement by Prime Minister Tony Blair that a bribery investigation would damage diplomatic relations); Andrew Hill, BAE Proves Its Readiness for Just This Sort of War, FIN.
TIMES (London), Aug. 9, 2007 (detailing the U.K.’s fear that investigating a
defense corporation for its bribery would hurt foreign relations).
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Although some of these benefits may accrue whether or not
nations put forth a united effort towards mandating corporate
certification of records and auditing of controls, a scheme with
a common standard would go a long way in ensuring compliance and lowering costs for businesses.142 The international
financial community has already stepped towards other international corporate standards, most notably with the coalescing
of national accounting practices around the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).143 In August 2008, the
SEC voted to begin the process of switching to IFRS in place of
the current GAAP standards used in the United States by
2014.144 Canada and Japan plan to switch to the standard by
2011.145 The adoption of uniform accounting standards by countries around the world demonstrates an existing commitment
to transparency in corporate books and records, and bodes well
for similar advances in auditing and certification standards.
CONCLUSION
Bribery of foreign government officials harms both the developing and developed world. Current government regulations,
while an improvement over past systems, still fail to provide
adequate enforcement of existing laws against bribery. In addition, the United States has taken a lead role in the prosecution
of corporate bribers, thanks in part to its more robust requirements for the certification and auditing of financial reports of
companies which are publicly traded there. By creating uniform
standards through an international convention requiring man142. See, e.g., MOLONEY, supra note 116, at 7 (noting, in the context of European securities regulation, that “[r]egulatory divergences and the duplication of rules can amount to non-tariff barriers . . . and prevent the development of the level playing-field . . . .”).
143. The International Accounting Standards Board publishes the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) which are permitted or required
for use on financial reports in 113 nations. IASPlus.com, IAS Plus—Use of
IFRSs by Jurisdiction, http://www.iasplus.com/country/useias.htm (last visited
Jan. 19, 2009).
144. Kara Scannell & Joanna Slater, SEC Moves to Pull Plug on U.S. Accounting Standards, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2008, at A1; News Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Proposes Roadmap Toward Global Accounting Standards to Help Investors Compare Financial Information More
Easily (Aug. 27, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008184.htm.
145. AICPA Announces Web Site on International Financial Reporting
Standards, CPA LETTER (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants, New York,
N.Y.), June 2008, at 1, available at http://www.aicpa.org/download/cpaltr/
2008_06/jun08.pdf.
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agement certification of financial reports and external auditing
of internal controls, corporate activities will become more
transparent world wide. While shareholders appreciate such
transparency so they can better appreciate a corporation’s
worth and risk, governments can use this information to prosecute companies that try to obtain an unfair advantage through
bribery of foreign government officials.

